This article proposes that British courts have an inherent power to issue nonbinding, common law
Introduction
It is over eight years since the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) came into force in the United Kingdom, and its constitutional impact during that time has been substantial. 1 With this act, Parliament " incorporated " rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), giving them effect in domestic law. Although the U.K. had long been a party to this regional human rights treaty, its provisions had never been directly enforceable in British courts prior to the HRA because of the country's change, the act arguably has promoted a new " human rights culture " in British law.
But the honeymoon, as they say, is over. With the ongoing, so-called war against terrorism, the Human Rights Act faces its greatest, long-term test as a serious bulwark of individual rights. In this respect so far, the HRA (and, one might also say, the judiciary) has been resilient vis-à-vis the government's battery of tough antiterrorism measures, 6 showing real teeth. In the case of A and Others (No. 1) , 7 perhaps most notably, the House of Lords Appellate Committee quashed the government's emergency derogation order under article 15 of the ECHR, intended to exempt the U.K. from its regular obligations under the convention. Consequently, the Law Lords declared that the indefi nite detention of suspected alien terrorists under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was incompatible with articles 5 and 14 of the convention, which together guarantee the right to liberty and security of the person without discrimination on grounds such as national origin. The House of Lords has also shown that " control orders " imposed by the executive against suspected terrorists can be incompatible with the convention when they place extreme, arguably punitive restrictions on an individual's freedom of movement, privacy, and personal associations without adequate due process of law. 8 Decisions such as these have provoked harsh reactions against both the judiciary and the HRA from members of the Labour Government (which, ironically, brought in the act under Prime Minister Tony Blair), as well as the Conservative opposition. Some prominent politicians have gone so far as to suggest that the HRA needs to be revised in the face of the terror threat or scrapped altogether in favor of a wholly British bill of rights. 9 All the while, political rhetoric about public security concerns -whether in regard to terrorism, crime, or antisocial behavior -continues unabated, raising questions about the future role of the Human Rights Act.
What all this means is that one must not take for granted the continuation of the HRA nor naively assume that Parliament will never exercise its powers in a heavy-handed manner at the behest of a security-prioritizing government, even if one with good intentions. While the sky is not falling, it is not inconceivable 6 See Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11; Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act, 2001 that, one day, courts might fi nd themselves adjudicating rights claims after Parliament has effectively " dis-incorporated " the convention in some way. However, exclusive focus on the HRA and particular individual rights overlooks other important, systemic political mechanisms in the United Kingdom for protecting rights more generally. Responsible government, separation of powers, and regional pluralism all ensure that the Crown and Parliament exercise their power as part of a modern, liberal democratic state. Government decision making within this larger constitutional context not only gains strength and legitimacy from individual rights but affords them some protection through Britain's unique political institutions. With or without the HRA, nevertheless, a government might occasionally seek to bypass the usual decision-making channels for the sake of perceived urgency, national security, or political expediency.
This article proposes a judicial remedy to protect rights in anticipation of any unfortunate though possible rollback of the HRA in the future, a remedy that would operate at the systemic level, where political decision making takes place. It suggests that courts have an inherent, discretionary power to declare when Parliament exercises its sovereign power in an " unconstitutional " way; that is, when Parliament legislates against legal norms or fundamental baselines for political behavior deemed by courts of special signifi cance within Britain's unwritten constitution. This common law " declaration of unconstitutionality " -though legally unenforceable in light of parliamentary sovereignty -is a natural extension of the judicial process of interpreting, hierarchically ordering, and reconciling various legal sources. As part of this interpretive process, courts recognize that some common law rights, conventions, or fundamental statutes have a higher, constitutional status over other " ordinary " laws. The constitutional principles judicially derived from these privileged legal sources are part of a substantive rule-oflaw framework that infl uences statutory interpretation and resists legislative departures except by Parliament's clear intent. Thus, the courts have already developed a nascent constitutional jurisprudence, existing independently of the HRA, which protects individual liberty on multiple levels. Parliament could be said, therefore, to act " unconstitutionally " by infringing common law rights directly or by threatening them indirectly through interference with the norms of democratic decision making found in conventions and fundamental statutes. A nonbinding declaration of unconstitutionality would only formally announce that the courts have been unable to reconcile a statute with these judicially recognized, higher-order principles, because Parliament may have clearly legislated incompatibly with them. The declaration would make clear the legal costs of government actions and ensure open political accountability.
It should be made clear that this article focuses on a declaration of unconstitutionality as a new and practical constitutional remedy. The supporting argument is intended to be straightforward and simple, and it builds on much ground already well covered. This work does not explore any old theories or propound any novel ones about a common law constitution and the nature of parliamentary sovereignty. More able scholars have done that already. 10 Moreover, as a nonbinding remedy, this declaration does not undermine or challenge parliamentary sovereignty. Rather, as put forward in this paper, the declaration openly recognizes Parliament's exercise of sovereign power within (or, one might say, against) an accepted constitutional context. In light of the established constitutional jurisprudence, sophisticated theoretical justifi cations for the proposed declaration of unconstitutionality are now unnecessary for the judge or practitioner who has concluded that a supreme Parliament may not have lived up to its constitutional obligations, and that a reviewing court should just get on with it and say so.
11 Suffi cient justifi cation for this remedy becomes clear with a basic review of Britain's new constitutional jurisprudence and the judicial interpretive process that goes with it. Theory has done its job this far; only a bold judge need take the fi nal and logical step to declare when Parliament transgresses accepted constitutional boundaries to the exercise of its power.
. Common law rights
It is now established by British case law that some common law rights have a special constitutional status vis-à-vis confl icting statutes, with the result that Parliament can limit such rights only by expressly legislating against them. Cases show that, in fi nding a statute plainly irreconcilable with judicially recognized common law rights, a court necessarily must decide that Parliament 10 Admittedly, this article draws on ideas long before advocated by proponents of a value-enriched, common law constitution. However, this paper rests upon the premise that such a constitutional theory has already largely been incorporated by British judges, so that the law now supports a declaratory remedy against unconstitutional acts of Parliament. See T. R. S. A LLAN See also E LLIOTT , supra note 10, at 6 -9, 19 -21 (suggesting even that judges on the whole have failed in articulating a positive, coherent theoretical basis for the expansion of judicial review generally).
has legislated contrary to its constitutional obligations. In the event of such confl ict, of course, the express will of Parliament must prevail. Nevertheless, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty simply cannot conceal the court's underlying conclusion of unconstitutionality. Indeed, judicial application of the doctrine in the face of common law rights forces such a conclusion into the open. 12 As part of the interpretive process, then, courts must differentiate higher-order principles from " ordinary " law and attempt to reconcile these principles with parliamentary sovereignty; where they cannot a constitutional confl ict occurs. There is, therefore, a nascent constitutional jurisprudence already in the United Kingdom, which allows -even demands -that courts give effect to Parliament's legislative power within the context of a substantive rule of law and to make clear failed attempts to do so.
13
Ex parte Leech 14 was one of the fi rst major indicators of this emerging constitutional jurisprudence. In that case, (then) Lord Justice Steyn reaffi rmed the long-standing judicial " presumption against statutory interference with vested common law rights. " 15 Some rights, he then extrapolated, had special constitutional signifi cance. One such right was unimpeded access to the courts, which required a prisoner's access to legal consultation with a solicitor. Thus, legal access, " [e]ven in our unwritten constitution … must rank as a constitutional right. "
16 Lord Justice Steyn explained that a court should fi nd statutory interference with such a basic right only where Parliament has used express language, while a necessary implication for interference should be a rarity.
17 12 The interpretive process supporting a common law declaration of incompatibility is, therefore, essentially the same as that behind a section 4 declaration of incompatibility under the HRA; Mark Elliott is critical of judicially fashioned, common law -based review of statutory powers, on the grounds that it would establish autonomous rules for the judicial review of government actions having the same " analytical implications " [emphasis added] as review under the HRA. In his view, this would make common law review incompatible with parliamentary sovereignty. Elliott's assessment of the similar interpretive processes under the HRA and common law review is right, although his conclusion that common law review would undermine parliamentary sovereignty is misplaced in light of the facts that ( a ) courts have long given preference to autonomous common law rules in interpreting and applying statutes, and ( b ) in any case, express statutory provisions must nevertheless prevail in the event of any confl ict. See E LLIOTT , supra note 10, at 235 -237. See also Christopher Forsyth & Mark Elliott, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review , 2003 P UB . L. 286, 290 -294. 13 Lord Lester has, among others, alluded to a new constitutional jurisprudence in clear terms: " It may be subversive in the eyes of government to suggest that British guiding constitutional principles ' are raised above the reach of statute and State ' , but in reality our adherence to European and international human rights law has had that effect; and a new body of jurisprudence is arising to refl ect the changing constitution. Unequivocally endorsing a special constitutional status for some rights, he explained the implications that such status had for statutory interpretation and for the ways in which Parliament must exercise its legislative power:
In the unwritten legal order of the British state, at a time when the common law continues to accord a legislative supremacy to Parliament, the notion of a constitutional right can in my judgment inhere only in this proposition, that the right in question cannot be abrogated by the state save by a special provision in an Act of Parliament, or by regulations whose vires in main legislation specifi cally confers that power to abrogate. General words will not suffi ce. And any such rights will be creatures of the common law, since their existence would not be the consequences of the democratic political process but would be logically prior to it.
19
According to Justice Laws, certain constitutional rights are intrinsic to the common law, even without reference to the European Convention. 20 As such, they defi ne Parliament's constitutional obligations in legislating, although they do not legally limit its sovereign power. Moreover, Parliament can only infringe such rights by express language.
21
For these reasons, constitutional rights would continue to infl uence statutory interpretation even if Parliament chose to " dis-incorporate " the convention. In many cases, the common law would afford similar protections. 22 The House of Lords has recognized that the common law encompasses, for example, the guarantee against retrospective increase of a criminal sentence ( Ex parte Pierson ) 23 convention. The independent existence of common law constitutional rights might also mean, for present purposes, that they could conceivably offer protection in some circumstances where the incorporated convention does notwhere convention rights end, the common law might yet occupy ground. 25 Such overlapping fi elds of protection, as in those convention states with written guarantees of constitutional rights, might then expand rights protections beyond what either the common law or the convention alone offers.
In Ex parte Lightfoot , 26 Justice Laws elaborated on the close relationship between these constitutional rights and the apparently confl icting doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Looking past the precise scope or defi nition of discrete rights for the moment, he justifi ed the more general notion of higherorder principles by rooting them deeply within the very democratic system that legitimizes legislative power and responsible government:
Whether express words are necessary or not, the abrogation of constitutional rights must require specifi c provision by Parliament to that effect, since that is the only means by which the common law can accord such rights a special status; otherwise they are writ in water. The importance of the point for present purposes is that it provides a very powerful reason why the law should be astute to confi ne the concept of constitutional right to that special class of rights which, in truth, everyone living in a democracy under the rule of law ought to enjoy. Access to justice is one. Freedom of the person, of speech, thought, and religion are others. They are largely articulated in the principal provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights … , which is to be enacted into our law … [This interpretive approach] is fully in harmony with the proper powers of the democratic arm of the state where what is at stake is the denial of rights which no democrat could deny save on pain of self-contradiction. 27 As Justice Laws characterized them, constitutional rights are embedded within a substantive conception of the rule of law that is intimately bound up with democracy and the legitimate exercise of government power. 28 Not only do they overlap with the convention but they represent fundamental values that Parliament cannot legislate against without risking damage to democratic order and so, in turn, undermining the democratic claim to the legitimacy of its own sovereign power. 29 This view of the connection between common law rights and the rule of law in Britain resembles the doctrine of " implied rights " in Australian constitutional law. In Australia, courts have explored the notion that fundamental rights arise from an autonomous rule of law that underlies, informs, and possibly even supplements the written Constitution, which otherwise lacks a bill of rights. 30 While some have criticized the doctrine of implied rights, and its further development in the courts seems to have stalled, it remains an important development in the constitutional law in that country. 31 As such, it provides British judges an example of how courts can assess the constitutionality of legislation based on unwritten, judicially articulated principles. Three seminal cases illustrate just how such principles can support the constitutional review of statutes.
The fi rst case, Leeth v. Commonwealth , 32 involved Commonwealth legislation that tied criminal sentencing to the laws of several Australian states. The Supreme Court of Australia upheld the legislation, fi nding that some disparities in sentencing, due to differences in state law, did not violate an implied right of equality before the law. Dissenting from the fi nal judgment, Justices Deane and Toohey plainly put forward a theory of common law rights, existing behind the veneer of the written constitution. To them, the idea of equality was implicit both in the " free agreement " of the people at the time of confederation and in the nature of the judicial process. 33 Furthermore, several provisions of the Constitution also made manifest " fundamental common law principles upon which it is structured … . " Supreme Court found that the Australian Constitution implied a " freedom of communication, " necessary for the functioning of a parliamentary democracy. 37 In Nationwide , the Court addressed the question whether a Commonwealth law, making it an offense to criticize the Industrial Relations Committee, was reasonably and appropriately adapted to the constitutional power of Parliament to settle and prevent industrial disputes, and, if so, whether the measure taken nevertheless would be disproportionate in the adverse consequences that it caused. In making this assessment, the Court found that " it is material to ascertain whether those adverse consequences result in any infringement of fundamental values protected by the common law, such as freedom of expression. "
38 The Court decided that the law, indeed, was disproportionate in its adverse impact on this implied right. Similarly, in Australian Capital Television , the Court invalidated a law restricting political advertising. The Supreme Court found that freedom of communication was necessary in a democratic, representative government and was, therefore, an implied restriction on Parliament's legislative powers. The Court later narrowed this doctrine of implied rights in cases such as Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation , 39 tying it more closely to the constitutional text rather than to the open contours of the common law. Nevertheless, the Lange Court reaffi rmed that some implied rights do exist in Australia, inherent in the democratic political system and incident to more specifi c textual provisions in the Australian Constitution.
The Australian implied rights doctrine shows that courts can articulate and use fundamental common law rights to assess the constitutionality of legislation. Of course, one must keep in mind that the British legal system differs from that of Australia in that there exists in the U.K. no written, supreme constitution from which judges might either extract or to which they might attach unwritten rights, as was done in Leeth , Nationwide , and Australian Capital Television . However, as this essay's introduction suggests, questions about the theoretical source or legitimacy of unwritten rights in the U.K. (such questions still exist in Australia) 40 are now backward-looking, in light of the House of Lords ' clear and repeated endorsement of the constitutional status of some autonomous common law rights. Indeed, the House of Lords has developed its own doctrine of common law rights, existing independently of any legislative or constitutional texts, and that, potentially, goes much further than the 37 But cf. United States v. Carolene Products Corp., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (suggesting that legislative provisions which, for example, interfered with rights related to participation in the democratic political process or targeted vulnerable minorities could demand more exacting judicial scrutiny for constitutionality). implied rights doctrine in Australia. Still, the existence of a written constitution in Australia should not obscure the antipodean lesson for British judges; namely, that judges can articulate unwritten, common law norms and assess the constitutionality of legislation against them.
Accordingly, this new constitutional jurisprudence in Britain enhances the working relationship between the courts and Parliament, already long established and implicit in the judicial review of administrative action. It is not a new idea that Parliament exercises its legislative power fi rmly within a rule-of-law context, guarded by the judiciary. The dynamics prevailing between the branches of government (which includes the confl icts, of course) can encourage a more refl ective decision-making process on the part of the omnipotent legislature; moreover, the same dynamics may render the Parliament not only more attentive to certain values but may promote greater political accountability on the part of elected offi cials. 41 Parliamentary sovereignty, nevertheless, ensures that the democratically elected legislature retains the fi nal word over the unelected judiciary. In this light, a declaration of unconstitutionality would make clear to elected offi cials and the public that courts and Parliament have reached an impasse in their respective views of the legislature's constitutional obligations. Resolution of the constitutional confl ict would then be left to the democratic political process.
A declaration of unconstitutionality thus fi ts with the uncontroversial notion that the U.K. Parliament ought to exercise its sovereignty within a larger, rule-of-law context. Were Parliament to act in a possibly unconstitutional way, it runs two risks. First, Parliament would be legislating in a manner that threatens to loosen its sovereign power from the normative, democratically rooted moorings of its own legitimacy. 42 Even popular or seemingly trivial 41 See Lord Lester, supra note 13, at 686 -689 (considering the institutional dynamics of constitutional jurisprudence and its substantive content constitutional infractions should raise concerns about Parliament's willingness to legislate contrary to the usual baselines that moderate the exercise of its legally limitless power. Second, if Parliament has expressly legislated against constitutional principles, this would suggest it has decided that these same baselines have exceptions or, perhaps of greater concern, no longer have the same normative validity. 43 Even if these exceptional legislative measures are temporary and arguably justifi able -indeed, even maybe appropriate, as a form of constitutional " amendment " -their long-term implications can be unpredictable. By requiring Parliament to make plain its intentions to interfere with prevailing constitutional principles, courts can temper otherwise unlimited legislative power by avoiding interferences through implication alone. Furthermore, a court, in concluding that Parliament has expressly interfered with these higher-order principles, can make the costs and risks plain to elected offi cials and the voting public. A declaration of unconstitutionality would no more interfere with parliamentary sovereignty than would the interpretive process that has led to it. Indeed, such a declaration actually would contribute to open political debate and promote the democratic process that legitimizes the sovereignty doctrine in the fi rst place. 44 Therefore, as Lord Steyn put it in Ex parte Pierson , " common law and statute coalesce in one legal system, "
45 in which higher-order, constitutional rights and other principles independently coexist and interact with " ordinary " law. This means that they, together, create an expanded fi eld of rights protection, even in the event of " dis-incorporation " of the ECHR, 46 by way of the regular process of statutory interpretation. A declaration of unconstitutionality would, for these reasons, only announce the result of a court's failed attempt to reconcile guiding constitutional principles with parliamentary sovereignty, 47 ultimately leaving the confl ict for political resolution. 
. Constitutional conventions
The power to issue a declaration of unconstitutionality would not be restricted necessarily to use only where Parliament directly infringes common law rights. A declaration could also be issued where Parliament threatens rights indirectlyfor example, by violating other constitutional norms that regulate democratic political activity at a systemic level. In this way, a declaration would protect rights even with the HRA still in place; it would do so by promoting the decision-making channels on which all rights depend and, in turn, foster. Parliament possibly could obstruct or disrupt these channels, for example, were it to legislate against conventions or fundamental statutes having normative value. Like common law rights, they, too, contribute to a substantive rule of law that constrains and legitimizes Parliament's otherwise unlimited legal power.
Unlike common law rights, however, conventions and fundamental statutes have a somewhat different relationship to legislation. While the common law stands apart and separate from legislation -and indeed is autonomously rooted in the judicial process -fundamental statutes are, on the surface, indistinguishable from any other " ordinary " statute passed by Parliament. Nevertheless, they have attained an iconic status, representing deeper constitutional principles, a process discussed in the next section of this paper. Conventions, on the other hand, are not even rules of law, strictly speaking. Still, their constitutional importance in the United Kingdom is immense, as they typically regulate how democratic decision making actually takes place in a political system lacking a formal, written constitution. The normative quality of conventions accordingly ensconces them, along with fundamental statutes and common law rights, in a constitutional jurisprudence that supports judicial declarations against Parliament's unconstitutional acts.
Many conventions indirectly protect rights in the U.K. by systemically regulating political and legal processes, ensuring that government power rests on democratic foundations. For example, the Crown will not refuse royal assent to a bill passed by Parliament, and ministers must be accountable to Parliament. Nevertheless, conventions are not legal rules, strictly speaking, and so remain unenforceable in the courts. However, as with common law rights, " unenforceable " does not mean judicially " unrecognizable " or " without legal effect. " Legal rules and conventions together form the whole of the British Constitution; a breach of convention, while not a breach of law, is still a breach of the Constitution -a crucial distinction in British public law that might seem contradictory to foreign observers accustomed to written constitutional rules synonymous with legality. Despite the judicial obligation to acknowledge parliamentary sovereignty, a court's refusal to take notice of conventions, where they come into play, would overlook much constitutional law and ignore how the Constitution, in practice, erects a democratic, substantive rule-of-law framework, which courts are themselves bound to uphold. The normative value of conventions as higher-order principles is in no way diminished by their status or judicial characterization as something other than strict legal rules. 50 Without conventions, the Constitution loses its modern, democratic mechanisms and becomes no more than the bare frame of an old, still autocratically minded relic of the Glorious Revolution in 1688 -89. That is a thin vision that courts, already committed to a new constitutional jurisprudence, cannot take without contradiction or even self-delusion.
Conventions, therefore, create democratically focused expectations for political actors, jurists, as well as all other citizens, while they also factor into the process by which courts interpret primary legislation. 51 This role in statutory construction gives them an indirect legal effect. In perhaps the most notable U.K. case of this kind, Attorney General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd. , 52 the English High Court found that the convention of joint cabinet responsibility informed the understanding of the law of confi dentiality. The court gave legal effect to the convention and related its politically systemic function back to common law doctrines of private rights and obligations. Accordingly, the court restrained the publication of a minister's writings that would breach the confi dence owed by the minister to the Queen in the conduct of governmental business. As an interpretational aid, apparent in Jonathan Cape , a convention can have legal effect (despite not being a legal rule, strictly speaking) by shaping statutory meaning much as common law rights can have just such effects. 53 construction of a statute in light of a convention, therefore, involves the same interpretive process that applies to common law rights. Conventions are part and parcel of a constitutional jurisprudence through which courts will hold government to the rule of law, with or without the HRA. Conventions are also important democratic mechanisms in parliamentary systems throughout the Commonwealth. Two cases, one before the Privy Council and the other before the Supreme Court of Canada, demonstrate how courts can take notice of conventions ' constitutional roles. In Madzimbamuto v. LardnerBurke , 54 the Privy Council considered the lawfulness of an act of the U.K. Parliament meant to have effect in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). After the colony's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965, Parliament passed the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, reaffi rming imperial power over the African colony and authorizing the Crown to make orders in council in any matter necessary or expedient in face of the colony's attempts at independence. A subsequent order in council, among other points, suspended the country's 1961 constitution, suspended the authority of the Southern Rhodesian legislature, and granted sweeping rulemaking authority to a secretary of state. The Southern Rhodesian government simply ignored Parliament and the Crown; its legislature ratifi ed a new, independence constitution, continued to enforce a state of national emergency arising from racial and civic unrest, and so authorized the government to continue detaining Daniel Madzimbamuto (who, engaged in the struggle for majority rule, had previously been arrested) on security grounds. The detainee's wife, as applicant, argued that her husband's detention was unlawful in light of the Southern Rhodesia Act.
One of the respondent's arguments, on behalf of the Southern Rhodesian government, rested upon a constitutional convention by which Parliament would not legislate for Southern Rhodesia without the consent of the government on matters within the local legislative assembly's competence. 55 Accordingly, the act of the U.K. Parliament would be invalid. The Privy Council, per Lord Reid, tersely dismissed this submission in a short paragraph; however, he did so in a way that did not foreclose constitutional review in an appropriate case. First, Lord Reid recognized that it would be unconstitutional for Parliament to do certain things, because the " moral, political and other reasons against doing them are so strong … . 55 The respondent made two other arguments supporting the authority of the Southern Rhodesian government to detain the petitioner, which necessitated a judicial examination of the constitutional situation in the country. One argument was, even assuming that the actions of the Southern Rhodesian government were unlawful, courts must give them effect under a doctrine of necessity for preserving civil order and de facto control of national territory. Except for one dissent, the Privy Council rejected this argument. It also rejected an argument that Parliament had previously limited its sovereignty by granting self-government to Southern Rhodesia. 57 Still, the Privy Council had seemed prepared to recognize a confl ict between convention and statute, should a convention actually govern a case. 58 In such circumstances, judicial reconciliation of the confl ict would necessarily lead to the conclusion that Parliament has legislated in an unconstitutional way, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty notwithstanding. In Madzimbamuto , the Privy Council avoided a confl ict by making the convention in question contingent on Southern Rhodesia's observance of its original constitution.
Although there is no evidence for it in the case report, one is tempted to believe that the privy councillors might have kept in mind the core of the controversy before it. That is, the case was not just about a power struggle between the imperial Parliament and a wayward colony. The case at bar concerned a man detained by a racist regime, attempting to govern outside a democratically rooted, substantive rule of law. The Privy Council's decision, consciously or not, seemed to refl ect the democratic nature of conventions, specifi cally, by refusing to apply one in circumstances where it would actually subvert the rule of law. Read the other way around, Madzimbamuto suggests that a court might fi nd a convention to limit Parliament if the convention's operation, instead, supported the same democratic, substantive rule-of-law framework in which Parliament itself exercises its sovereign power. 59 The Canadian Patriation Reference 60 made this position clearer. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that an act of the Canadian Parliament was incompatible with a certain convention. 61 The Reference concerned the attempt of the Canadian government to " patriate " the Canadian Constitution. The government intended to request the U.K. Parliament to surrender all legislative power to Canada, allow for Canadian amendment of the Constitution, and attach to it a Charter of Rights. Although the Canadian Parliament had authority to request imperial legislation from the U.K. Parliament, a constitutional convention had developed whereby the federal government would fi rst consult with and gain approval from the provincial governments before doing so. Several provinces refused to agree to the federal government's proposed constitutional amendments, fearing that they would decrease provincial autonomy and powers. The government pushed ahead and insisted that Parliament forward the constitutional proposals to the U.K. Parliament without provincial support. Several provinces brought suit in the courts, seeking declarations that the federal Parliament could not constitutionally request legislation from the U.K. Parliament without their agreement, as convention forbade such unilateral federal initiatives.
Following a lower court reference, the Supreme Court found that, strictly as a matter of law, Parliament could lay the proposals before the U.K. Parliament despite an unenforceable constitutional requirement to observe the convention. The Court approached the issue in two steps. First, a majority of justices 62 cited Madzimbamuto for the proposition that conventions, by nature, were different from regular legal or other written constitutional rules in that the former depended on political practices, were judicially unenforceable, and might only in exceptional circumstances crystallize into a clear rule of law. 63 As such, no convention could legally restrict the Canadian Parliament's authority to forward the proposals without provincial consultation and approval.
The Court, however, went further. Six justices 64 decided that the convention claimed by Manitoba, Newfoundland, and Québec did indeed exist, while three 65 found it did not. However, all nine justices unanimously agreed that judges had the power to decide whether the convention existed and whether Parliament had complied with it. Thus, although the dissenters did not wish to term a breach of convention as " unconstitutional in any strict or legal sense, " 66 even they went on to state that " courts may recognize the existence of conventions in their proper sphere. " 67 As for the majority, it characterized conventions as constitutional rules, 68 and that " it is perfectly appropriate to say that to violate a convention is to do something which is unconstitutional although it entails no direct legal consequence. " 69 In its view, courts were perfectly capable of recognizing and applying conventions " to provide aid for and background to constitutional or statutory construction. "
70 Where Parliament or the Crown acted within its legal powers but against a convention, the action would be legally valid but, nonetheless, unconstitutional. The Supreme Court accordingly declared:
We have reached the conclusion that the agreement of the provinces of Canada, no views being expressed as to its quantifi cation, is constitutionally required for the passing of the [Resolution] and that the passing of this Resolution without such agreement would be unconstitutional in the conventional sense.
71
The government, in response to the decision, held a conference afterward to renegotiate the patriation terms with the provinces, eventually achieving the consent of all but Quebec. 72 The convention at issue in the Patriation Reference , with regard to Canadian federalism as well as to efforts to secure full legal selfdetermination for Canada, raised many questions about just how conventions might protect abstract rights systemically in sometimes contradictory, competing, or unpredictable ways. Nevertheless, the case showed a connection between conventions and democratic political processes, while the subsequent actions of the federal government suggested the utility and infl uence that a declaration of unconstitutionality similarly might have on the U.K. Parliament in upholding and promoting those processes.
The Canadian Supreme Court's decision in the Patriation Reference, built as it was on Madzimbamuto , made clear that courts could identify and recognize, if not enforce, conventions against confl icting statutes. Unenforceability did not make a convention any less of a constitutional rule, however. These two cases distinguished between a strictly legal act, on the one hand, and constitutional acts of government more broadly construed, on the other. Therefore, 67 Id. at 856. 68 Id. at 874. 69 Id. at 883. 70 Id. at 886. 71 Id. at 909. 72 See Re: Objection to Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (where the Supreme Court rejected a claim by Quebec that its consent was required to the patriation resolution as a matter of convention. Not only had passage of the Constitution Act, 1982 arguably made the question moot, but the convention that there be a " substantial degree " of provincial consent did not require unanimity).
judicial recognition of conventions -and a declaration of unconstitutionality when they are broken -fl ows naturally from the same interpretive process applied to common law rights. Both cases, very much concerned with democratic processes, showed that conventions have an important place in constitutional jurisprudence because they support a rule of law that restrains government power. On this systemic level, conventions indirectly protect rights. The Canadian and Southern Rhodesian cases suggest, accordingly, that judicial determination of whether a convention applies or not in any particular circumstances will likely be substantively based on how it would or would not promote democratic political processes. 73 The result in the Patriation Reference, in particular, showed the role that a declaration could have in helping -not hindering -those processes by making clear the conventional boundaries to Parliament's exercise of sovereign authority; the effect of the declaration, however, would still leave the ultimate resolution of a constitutional confl ict to politicians and the electorate. 74 Furthermore, the systemic protections that conventions afford rights, generally, would justify a declaration with or without the incorporation of the ECHR; these homegrown conventions defend the democratic, substantive rule-of-law framework on which all rights both depend and build.
. Fundamental statutes
When common law and statute coalesce in one legal system, it is not only because the common law impacts statutory interpretation and guides Parliament in fulfi lling its constitutional obligations. Sometimes, statutes can also have such normative signifi cance that they themselves embody or generate higher-order principles that weave into a common law constitutional fabric. These fundamental statutes combine with common law rights and conventions to form a constitutional jurisprudence that is partly unwritten, partly written. While detailed provisions of these statutes might undergo legislative change from time to time, their core principles transcend text, intertwine with basic rights and conventions, and make up the substantive rule of law that constrains Parliament. Like conventions, these statutes protect rights independently of the ECHR, supporting a declaration of unconstitutionality upon their violation. Moreover, the HRA itself has quickly acquired constitutional status, so that signifi cant legislative alteration of it would quite likely be unconstitutional on its own accord. 75 The constitutional signifi cance of documents like the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of Settlement 1701, the Acts of Union, and the Great 73 See A LLAN , C ONSTITUTIONAL J USTICE , supra note 10, at 182 -183. 74 See A LLAN , supra note 42, at 253 -254. 75 See, e.g. , Jackson v. Attorney General, [2005] Whether statute, treaty, or in some other form, these documents have all affected the constitution on a normative level, progressively adding to and adjusting its baselines. 77 Many of these statutes systemically protect rights by buttressing democratic governance through institutional design and regionalism. Despite not having the same status as entrenched written constitutional provisions, fundamental statutes nevertheless have privileged status over ordinary laws in that courts will interpret primary legislation compatibly with them whenever possible. 78 Fundamental statutes, along with common law rights and conventions, construct the constitutional framework within which both Parliament and the Crown exercise power. The result is a dynamic, if patchwork, constitution, partly written in its sources, that will support a declaration of unconstitutionality were Parliament to legislate contrary to their core tenets. implication repealed section 2 of the European Communities Act insofar as that act might permit the executive to make regulations inconsistent with the 1985 law. The court rejected the appellants ' argument of implied repeal. Citing his decision in Witham 81 as authority, Justice Laws distinguished " ordinary " from " constitutional " laws, where the latter, especially, conditions the legal relationship between citizen and state, enlarging or diminishing fundamental rights. Parliament's amendment or repeal of a constitutional statute, therefore, could not be implied, he found, but must be express or arise from specifi c words leading to an irresistible inference. 82 Justice Laws found that the European Communities Act was just such a " constitutional statute which by force of the common law cannot be impliedly repealed. "
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This rule of construction gives the U.K., according to Justice Laws, " most of the benefi ts of a written constitution, " while " preserv[ing] the sovereignty of the legislature and the fl exibility of our uncodifi ed constitution. "
84 Where a court concludes that Parliament does expressly legislate against a constitutional statute, it therefore indicates that Parliament has acted in an unconstitutional, if strictly legal, way. This interpretive process reconciles the rule of law with parliamentary sovereignty, while a declaration of unconstitutionality would openly acknowledge that, in the view of a court, a confl ict had arisen between them. 85 Under the reasoning of Thoburn , outright amendment or repeal of the Human Rights Act itself, for example, would require that Parliament unambiguously do so in order to restrict or " dis-incorporate " convention rights. Even in that event, the Magna Carta, Bill of Rights 1689, and Great Reform Bill constitutionally establish basic rights principles such as habeas corpus, a right to petition, and a right to vote. Constitutional statutes in this way insinuate themselves into the common law, with both mutually informing and reinforcing each other. 86 Through their normative force, the principles enshrined in these special statutes have a value beyond their explicit text, elevating them above ordinary statutes and setting them in a substantive rule-of-law framework that restrains government power independently of the HRA. Like conventions, some fundamental statutes go beyond particular rights in order to defi ne the government's institutional structures and regulate democratic decision-making processes. The Parliament Acts, the Act of Settlement, and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (not yet in force) 87 do just this, while the Acts of Union and the devolution acts respect the values of regionalism. While not directly affecting individual rights, these structurally signifi cant statutes do so indirectly by establishing the institutional mechanisms or regional levels through which Parliament and the government must act. Institutional mechanisms prevent institutional or personal concentrations of power, which might permit decision makers to interfere arbitrarily, oppressively, or undemocratically with individual rights. Regionalism mitigates the overcentralization of government power for the same ends, by promoting some degree of regional equality, identity, or decision-making autonomy for the U.K. ' s constituent national communities.
The decision in Jackson v. Attorney General 88 not only illustrated the importance that fundamental statutes have but went so far as to suggest, in dicta, that, conceivably, they could legally limit parliamentary power under some circumstances. In Jackson , the appellants argued that 89 Lord Nicholls disagreed, however, arguing that section 2(1) necessarily implied that the House of Commons could not indirectly extend the life of Parliament by fi rst amending section 2(1), 90 leading to a conclusion that any bill purporting to do so by this two-step procedure could not be an act of Parliament and would, therefore, be legally invalid.
Most interesting, however, was the decision of Lord Steyn. He agreed with Lord Bingham that the House of Commons could use the procedures of the two Parliament acts to amend section 2(1) of the 1911 Act so as to permit the Commons to extend the life of Parliament without consent of the House of Lords. However, he explored the constitutional implications of such unicameral authority in the House of Commons. Under this interpretation of section 2(1), " the 1949 Act could also be used to introduce oppressive and wholly undemocratic legislation. "
91 Although the supremacy of Parliament remained the " general principle " [italics original] of the constitution, it was not absolute. Lord Steyn mused: " In exceptional circumstances involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of the courts, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords or a New Supreme Court may have to consider whether this is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish. "
92 Lord Steyn's warning raised doubts about the orthodox doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the constitutional responsibility of the courts to enforce a statute, should a government introduce legislation manifestly at odds with liberal democracy. 93 While one might not wish to speculate about or doubt the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, as did some of the Lords in Jackson , the case, nonetheless, reveals the special status that some statutes have in constructing the rule-of-law framework within which Parliament legitimately exercises its power.
Jackson also drew attention to regionalism, alongside bicameralism and the separation of powers, as a constitutional principle enshrined in fundamental statutes. Lord Hope re-affirmed the Acts of Union as constitutionally significant statutes, leading him to opine that " here too it may be said that the concept of a Parliament that is absolutely sovereign is not entirely in accord with the reality. "
94 As Lord Hope recognized in his citations, some judges have questioned whether the Acts of Union might not, in some circumstances, even legally limit Parliament's sovereignty rather than provide only unenforceable but normative baselines. 95 In any case, as illustrated by Thoburn , the Acts of Union or any other fundamental statute need not limit Parliament's sovereign power legally in order to generate higher-order principles that guide a court's statutory interpretation and support a nonbinding declaration of unconstitutionality. Furthermore, as with any fundamental statute, the higher-order status of the Acts of Union would not necessarily foreclose a judicial distinction between their material and immaterial breach, allowing Parliament to amend them in ways that would not undermine their normative principles. 96 The justiciability of a claim that Parliament has violated a fundamental statute, and the suitability of a declaration as a remedy in the case, would depend, accordingly, on the nature and seriousness of the alleged breach. With the Acts of Union, for example, some breaches might be minor 94 Id. ¶ 106. 98 This emphasis on principle, rather than strict text, results from the higher-order nature of fundamental statutes, which, like conventions or common law rights, make up a substantive rule of law that, at once, constrains and accommodates parliamentary power.
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Other statutes, in addition to the Acts of Union -the Scotland Act, the Northern Ireland Act, and the Government of Wales Act -establish quasifederal principles promoting regional autonomy and democratic governance. The Scotland Act, however, is perhaps the most interesting of the three statutes, in giving back to Scotland a parliament that can make primary legislation on devolved issues. Scotland's history as an independent nation with its own Crown and Parliament, and its having voluntarily united with England and Wales, arguably enhances the constitutional status of the Scotland Act by setting it within a unique historical and political context. 100 Although it retains sovereign power to legislate for Scotland, the Westminster Parliament will refrain from 97 Accordingly, should Parliament expressly amend or repeal a constitutional statute, as it did previously in suspending the Northern Ireland Act 1998 following the impending breakdown of the Good Friday Agreement, 103 the courts would then have to determine whether the interference so undermined the statute's underlying principles that it would justify a declaration. The Northern Irish situation, for instance, suggests the delicate political issues that courts would confront in deciding not just what alterations to constitutional statutes are serious or minor but also whether they are consistent with the statutes ' principles. For example, the U.K. Parliament took the extreme step of authorizing the suspension of devolved government under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, doing so in order to salvage the peace process and ensure stable, peaceful self-government in the region for the long term. From this perspective, the suspension of Northern Irish government arguably would have been constitutional in the sense of being consistent with the principles of devolution, although the Northern Ireland Act itself (for various reasons) might not have " constitutionally embedded " itself as quickly or as fi rmly as, say, the Scotland Act seems to have done.
The point is, faced with Parliament's express amendment or repeal of any of the terms of a constitutional statute, a court will be faced with two choices with regard to making a declaration. First, a judge must cautiously distinguish the constitutional from the unconstitutional alteration of a fundamental statute, looking beyond strictly textual alterations to overarching constitutional principles and the legislative purposes motivating the amendments in question. This assessment will require a teleological approach to constitutional adjudication. Taking again the example of the suspension of the Northern Irish government, Parliament's actions might arguably have been constitutional regarding the devolution project as a whole, especially given that devolution was itself in an early, somewhat experimental stage. 104 Furthermore, legislative changes to fundamental statutes might also be consistent with emerging 101 See Elliott, supra note 50, at 360 -361. 102 See Bogdanor, supra note 100, at 64 (predicting such a development, at least in regard to the Scotland Act, just after its passage). See also Elliott, supra note 50, at 353 -354, 356, 366. 103 See Northern Ireland Act, 2000, c. 1. 104 Nearly thirty years before, of course, Parliament had suspended self-government in Northern Ireland under the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972 and imposed direct rule in response to the escalating Troubles. Whether that action would now be considered " constitutional, " in light of the preceding fi fty years of Northern Irish government under the Government of Ireland Act 1920, is highly questionable. constitutional norms, valuably amending " out-of-date " ones. 105 Just what standards a judge would apply in distinguishing constitutional from unconstitutional alterations of fundamental statutes -and in deciding whether a declaration would be appropriate in the latter case -will require further elaboration by the courts. For now, however, it may be said that where Parliament has expressly and seriously contravened not only the terms but the spirit of a constitutional statute in an unjustifi able, disproportionate, or wanton way, courts can legitimately consider declaring the interfering law to be unconstitutional, leaving it for Parliament and the public to consider the ramifi cations of the offending actions.
The second approach toward declaring some infringement of a fundamental statute unconstitutional is strictly and more simply rooted in the text. That is, if Parliament expressly amends or repeals a fundamental text in any way, a court could consider making a declaration of unconstitutionality, highlighting the inconsistency of the resultant law with the special statute and then leaving it for parliamentary reconsideration through the political processes. With this second approach, a declaration of unconstitutionality would flow more directly from an interpretive conflict between contradictory, new legislation and the existing constitutional text, just as it would with the infringement of common law rights or conventions. Unlike with those rights or conventions, however, the hard text of fundamental statutes leaves less room for flexible judicial interpretation of the constitutional norms involved, or for their reconciliation with potentially conflicting, subsequent legislation. This could make a strict approach to judging a conflict between new legislation and a fundamental statute, perhaps, undesirable. The lack of flexibility might also make it more problematic for judges who, on wider principles, might be indisposed to declare the changes in question to be unconstitutional, especially as otherwise there would be no " amending procedure " by which the permanent alteration of a written constitutional norm could be achieved.
The above questions notwithstanding, Britain's new constitutional jurisprudence has now developed in a way that logically points toward a declaration of unconstitutionality based upon special textual provisions. Discerning the standards to be applied in distinguishing a constitutional from an unconstitutional breach is the next step on the path of legal development already chosen by the courts. While courts have long recognized certain documents to have special constitutional significance for purposes of statutory interpretation, the decision in Thoburn settled the fact that courts will now require Parliament to amend or repeal constitutional statutes by express language only. 105 See, e.g. , Universities (Scotland) Act, 1853, c. 89 (repealing the requirement under the Acts of Union that " in all time coming " professors and other staff at Scottish universities belong to the Church of Scotland).
The interpretive approach toward these statutes is, therefore, the same as that taken toward common law rights and conventions. Whether protecting individual rights directly or indirectly through the establishment of institutional structures and respect for regionalism, constitutional statutes establish the norms by which courts must assume Parliament exercises its supreme legislative power. Thus, " [i]t is possible to achieve the same practical effect as entrenchment whilst preserving continuing parliamentary legislative supremacy. "
106 Where a court fi nds that Parliament does clearly wish to amend or repeal a fundamental statute -at least in a material way that offends that statute's transcendent principles -the interpretive process points toward a conclusion that Parliament has legislated in an unconstitutional way. This, in turn, leads to and justifi es a nonbinding declaration to that effect.
. Is a Constitutional remedy foreclosed?
Until the Human Rights Act, no court had ever declared formally, as a remedy, that an act of Parliament violated individual rights. Of course, one might say that courts, once, were less protective of fundamental rights, more deferential to the political branches, and made little distinction between constitutional law and statutory law than is now the case. 107 Breaking with this more radical formalistic tradition, judicial recognition of substantive, higher-order values has risen in the past decades, along with a more assertive view of the judiciary in guarding the rule of law. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that no British court has ever explicitly disavowed the power to grant a declaration that Parliament has violated constitutional principles.
That said, some pre-HRA challenges to government action did seek declaratory relief, potentially raising this kind of constitutional confl ict. 109 courts refused to issue declarations that the Crown had violated convention or common law rights unlawfully; this was under circumstances where doubt might have arisen about the compatibility of the statute with fundamental rights. These two cases are often cited as showing the lack of rights protection before the HRA, as well as the unavailability of a judicial remedy for rights infringements. 110 These cases, then, have the greatest potential for undermining the argument that courts have the authority to make a declaration of unconstitutionality against Parliament. A reexamination of these cases, however, shows that they did not categorically reject a declaratory power in situations where a government infringes basic rights but only denied the higher status of the particular rights at issue. Malone and Brind , despite refusing to declare that the Crown had infringed any fundamental rights, actually left open the possibility that such declarations might issue against either it or Parliament under appropriate circumstances.
In Malone , the claimant sought declarations that, among other things, the police had tapped his telephone in the absence of statutory authorization, in contravention of rights at common law, and against section 8 of the unincorporated ECHR. The Chancery court refused to grant the declarations. Sir Robert Megarry V.C. made clear that declarations were available only as to " rights and liabilities that are enforceable in the courts, and not merely moral, social or political rights or liabilities that are not. " 111 In the case before him, Sir Robert found that rights under the convention were nonjusticiable -and so unenforceable -because they arose under a treaty unincorporated into domestic law.
112 Furthermore, the claimant had no legally recognizable rights of property, privacy, or confidentiality at common law that wiretapping would violate. 113 The claimant simply had no legal rights that would support the desired declaration that the wiretapping warrant was unlawful. 114 Moreover, Malone concerned wiretapping ordered by the executive and done without (but not contrary to) either common law or statutory authority; in the absence of any prohibitions against it, the tapping was lawful. 115 Malone, therefore, did not even address the issue of whether a declaration would be inappropriate or impossible as a remedy, where an act of Parliament itself violated a fundamental common law right. The closest Sir Robert came to analyzing the idea of a fundamental right was to reiterate that the court's declaratory power was " confined to 111 Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1979] Ch. at 353. 112 Id. at 354, 366, 378; Sir Robert V.C. also suggested that he might otherwise, as a matter of discretion, refuse such a declaration based on art. 8 because the plaintiff could still petition the Commission and the European Court of Human Rights under the Convention. Id. at 354. 113 Id. at 357 -362. 114 Lord Ross clearly made a similar point in Kaur v. Lord Advocate : " It follows that the pursuers ' case is irrelevant and incompetent since they are seeking declarator of a right which they do not have either under the municipal law of Scotland nor under Community law. " [1980] S.C. 319 at 336 (Ct. Sess.). 115 " If the tapping of telephones by the Post Offi ce at the request of the police can be carried out without any breach of the law, it does not require any statutory or common law power to justify it: it can lawfully be done simply because there is nothing to make it unlawful. " Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1979] Ch. at 367 ( per Sir Robert). unincorporated treaties and international law are no more than aids to statutory construction. 120 Neither decision resolved a confl ict between any act of Parliament and higher-order principles, for the simple reason that the courts found that the claimed rights did not exist in domestic law.
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Malone and Brind , as the two most prominent pre-HRA cases where declarations based on fundamental rights were sought and refused, never actually dealt with a confl ict between Parliament and a higher-order principle. Instead, both cases left open the possibility of such a confl ict, as well as of declaratory relief in that event. If one objects that there is no direct precedent for a declaration against Parliament, neither is there any against it. Therefore, any reading of these cases as foreclosing a declaration of unconstitutionality as a constitutional remedy is too broad. Such a broad reading would, furthermore, be at odds with the new constitutional jurisprudence and the courts ' interpretive process -both of which now clearly point toward a declaration where higherorder principles and a statute are irreconcilable.
Conclusion
In the years since the Human Rights Act came into force, courts have for the fi rst time directly and substantively reviewed acts of Parliament against fundamental rights, incorporated in the form of the European Convention on Human Rights. Where Parliament violates those rights, the HRA allows courts to make nonbinding declarations of incompatibility; ideally, this will increase Parliament's political accountability for respecting human rights. However, the declaration made in cases such as A and Others (No. 1) and other decisions under the HRA have incited criticisms of both judges and of the act itself, prompting not-so-veiled threats that future amendment of the HRA is not a political impossibility. It is perhaps not too outrageous to fear that, one day sooner or later, Parliament might amend or even repeal the Human Rights Act so as to " dis-incorporate " convention rights.
This article has argued, however, that such an unfortunate development would not extinguish the judicial power to declare acts of Parliament incompatible with constitutional norms, such as common law rights. Indeed, this constitutional remedy would be available even with the HRA in place; indeed, common law rights might offer greater protection than the ECHR, even as indigenous legal conventions and fundamental statutes can promote the systemic mechanisms of democratic government. Such a declaratory power resides in the courts by virtue of the interpretive process by which they apply a April 2009 Vol. 7: 183 constitutional jurisprudence that exists and evolves independently from the HRA These multiple sources of higher-order law, subject only to express amendment or repeal, establish principles within a substantive rule-of-law framework that both constrains legislative power and gives legitimacy to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Courts, therefore, will not lightly fi nd statutory confl ict with these constitutional principles and will require that Parliament make a contrary intent unmistakably clear. Where a court fi nds that Parliament has indeed exercised its sovereign power against these principles, it will also, and necessarily, conclude that Parliament has acted unconstitutionally. The logical extension of this interpretive process is that courts can formally issue a declaration of unconstitutionality in the event of a constitutional confl ict. No precedent precludes this constitutional remedy, nor would it undermine the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Such a declaration, like its statutory counterpart under section 4 of the Human Rights Act, would be nonbinding and not affect the legal validity of a statute. A declaration of unconstitutionality would instead complement parliamentary sovereignty, within the liberal democratic context, by enhancing government's political awareness of its constitutional obligations and its accountability to the electorate. Resolution of the constitutional confl ict, then, would be appropriately left to the democratic political process. With its sovereignty intact, the only objection Parliament could have to a declaration would be the desire to exercise its legislative power free from open and full accountability in the courts for violations of its constitutional obligations. And any attempt by Parliament to forbid a declarationshould a judge fi rst be brave enough to take this important next step of constitutional jurisprudence -would be, no doubt, unconstitutional.
